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
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NSC-U/SM-150E

September 23, 1976

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
The Under Secretary of Transportation
The Special Trade Representative
The Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality
The Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
Policy
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Acting Executive Director, Council on
International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Fourth Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Attached for your comment and/or concurrence
are a draft Memorandum for the President and the Fourth
Quarterly Report on the Implementation of the Final
Act of CSCE. Your response, which may be telephoned
to Mr. John Maresca, Department of State, 632-1358,
is requested by c.o.b. Monday, October 4, 1976.


Rutherford M. Poats
Acting Staff Director

Attachments:

As Stated

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Fourth Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

This quarterly report is the fourth submitted by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on implementation of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It covers the period May 1 - July 31, 1976, and reports those events related to the CSCE which have taken place since the end of the last reporting period.

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A general intensification of interest in CSCE associated with the first anniversary of Helsinki produced a wealth of statements and interpretations of CSCE in both East and West. Actual implementation steps were minimal, but there were some concrete actions and evidence of increased emigration from the USSR.

The first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE at the Helsinki Summit on August 1, 1975 dominated the reporting period. The approach of the anniversary prompted renewed interest in the Conference and its implications in all participant states. This development was accompanied by an intensified effort to interpret the significance of the Final Act and to evaluate developments since the Helsinki gathering.

The Communist states in particular launched a campaign of media attention and leadership statements aimed at establishing the Helsinki Summit as a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy, and a key watershed in post-war East-West relations, while advancing Communist

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interpretations of the Final Act and its implementation. Soviet propaganda traced the origins of the CSCE to the Genoa Conference of 1922 and argued that its successful conclusion demonstrated that the foreign policy of the Communist states was now as important as that of the capitalist states in shaping world events. The Communist countries depicted the Final Act as constituting recognition of the post-World War II European geo-political situation and as codification of the ground rules of "peaceful coexistence." While this campaign was largely a continuation of previous efforts, the level of attention devoted to it, as well as its overall scale and intensity, were significantly increased in connection with the Helsinki anniversary.

Western attitudes toward the Helsinki anniversary were considerably more restrained. Statements of Western leaders attributed much less importance to Helsinki and gave special attention to its provisions on the freer movement of people and ideas. They invariably indicated that judgment of the CSCE's place in history would

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depend on the extent to which its provisions are carried out. Western evaluation of implementation to date was also reserved, with political leaders suggesting that, although some useful steps had been made on a few Basket III issues, further progress would be required if the results of the Conference are to be judged positively.

Western media echoed the same reserve and skepticism. Although many Western journalists recognized the potential value of the Helsinki enterprise as a tool for moving the Communist states toward more liberal practices in the human rights and information fields, they generally evaluated Soviet and Eastern European implementation thus far as minimal. They also expressed reservations as to the Communists' intentions to carry out what Western governments believe to be their commitments under the Final Act.

The anniversary was also seen by most observers, East and West, as the mid-point between Helsinki and the Belgrade review meetings set to begin with a preparatory session in June, 1977. Political leaders and the

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press in all countries recognized the potential importance of the Belgrade meetings in terms of encouraging implementation of the Final Act's provisions and as a barometer of East-West relations in the coming period.

Another major indicator of developing attitudes toward Helsinki which occurred during the reporting period was the European Communist Parties' Conference (ECPC), held in Berlin, June 29-30. The treatment of CSCE subjects by the final document of this conference added a major new element to the Communist effort to interpret the results of the CSCE to suit Communist ideology and policy objectives. The document also established a formal relationship between the CSCE Final Act and relations among Communist parties, by which non-ruling European Communist parties joined in pledging themselves to support the Final Act. Speeches by Communist leaders at the Berlin Conference paid considerable attention to the CSCE and its implications. They generally accorded the CSCE high importance as a turning point in East-West relations, but were highly defensive regarding implementation and carried

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the process of reinterpretation of the Final Act to its highest level thus far. Brezhnev's speech was particularly defensive with regard to Soviet implementation, and sharply attacked Western countries, especially the US, for their alleged failure to implement the Final Act. Brezhnev's review of CSCE was remarkable for its detail and intensity.

Despite the increased rhetorical and media attention to CSCE and its implementation, concrete Soviet and Eastern European implementation steps all but dried up during the reporting period. Our Embassy in Moscow speculated that the Soviets may be saving whatever further implementation measures they may be prepared to adopt for the period immediately preceding the Belgrade meetings, when they will have maximum impact and will help to defuse the recriminations the Soviets evidently fear.

The Soviets also adopted a sharper, more polemical tone in our discussions with them on implementation, paralleling the tone of Soviet propaganda and leadership statements. Our response to this attitude was to point

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out privately to the Soviets that we have sought a constructive dialogue with them, not a counter-productive debate, and that their adoption of a polemical attitude will not help us achieve the full implementation the Soviets say they seek and intend.

The Soviets went even further in protesting the creation of the joint Legislative-Executive Commission on CSCE. In a "non-paper" handed to Assistant Secretary Hartman by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on June 17, the Soviets claimed that the Commission's focus on Basket III violated the Helsinki understanding that all parts of the Final Act are equal, and that the Commission's intention to monitor implementation by the USSR constituted interference in internal Soviet affairs. The Soviet media has bitterly attacked the Commission on these grounds and it is clear that the Soviets are particularly sensitive to its creation. One indication of their concern was the question of a Soviet diplomat in Washington who asked a State Department official whether the Commission would invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn to testify.

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There were, nevertheless, some concrete implementation steps during the reporting period. The Soviets gave their second notification of a major military maneuver (already reported in the last quarterly report), held near Leningrad, June 14-18. They invited observers from five countries, including NATO member Norway, to attend these maneuvers. In late July they announced that journalists in the USSR could apply for interviews directly to officials of Soviet ministries, rather than through the Foreign Ministry's press office, as previously required. Our Embassy in Moscow is observing how this measure will be carried out in practice in order to evaluate its real significance. Emigration of Soviets with exit visas for the US (almost all for the purpose of family reunification) is currently running at twice last year's rate. The flow of Soviet Jews leaving with exit visas for Israel is also up slightly this year, but the monthly rate has recently declined a bit. It remains to be seen whether this is a seasonal slump or the beginning of a downward trend.

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While not occurring during the reporting period, Ambassador Stoessel presented the Soviets with our 18th representation list on August 5, stressing its relationship to commitments undertaken by the Soviets under the family reunification provisions of the CSCE Final Act. The new list had been rigorously authenticated and totaled 112 families (312 individuals). Our last list, presented a year ago, included 249 families (641 individuals). Since that time, 35 family cases (95 individuals) had been resolved and 100 family cases (229 individuals) for various reasons have been withdrawn from the list--most of these had already emigrated, were planning visits rather than emigration, or had dropped their efforts to leave.

The Soviet dissident group, headed by Yuriy Orlov, which is monitoring Soviet implementation of CSCE, issued a statement on the Helsinki anniversary which concluded that the Soviet authorities do not intend to fulfill their human rights obligations under the Final Act but that the Final Act is, nevertheless, a useful

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tool for pressing them toward better performance on human rights.

One year after Helsinki, and ten months prior to the joint review of its results in Belgrade, there has been a general intensification of interest in the CSCE. Most Western countries, like ourselves, took the position at the Helsinki Summit that they expect meaningful implementation. Like the US, they have continued to stress the need for implementation, both in connection with the Helsinki anniversary and as the essential foundation for a successful Belgrade meeting. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies, sensitive to Western interest in the freer movement concepts of Basket III, have become increasingly defensive of their own practices and critical of what they see as Western implementation shortcomings.

The juxtaposition of these attitudes has produced the central problem of the CSCE's implementation phase: Western governments must respond to skeptical public opinion, as well as press and parliamentary criticism,

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on CSCE. The essential element in this response must be implementation by the Soviets and the Eastern European states of the CSCE's freer movement provisions. At the same time, it is these provisions that the Communist governments find most difficult to carry out. Yet the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans have a clear interest in making the CSCE a success. They want Belgrade '77 to be a "positive" meeting. But whether it is "positive" to the West depends on the extent to which the Communists themselves put "freer movement" into practice.

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FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

May 1, 1976 - July 31, 1976

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A. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

1. Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations
between Participating States.

Instances in which the CSCE principles were cited in relation to developments in European affairs increased significantly during the reporting period. This pattern was particularly true on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. The increased references to the principles brought out again sharp differences in interpretation between East and West and the tendency of the Soviets and their allies to focus only on those principles which are useful for their purposes. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs was cited particularly frequently by the Soviets in connection with alleged Western interference in the internal affairs of Italy and with alleged interference by the newly established US Commission on CSCE in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

The first anniversary of the Helsinki Summit generated a wealth of Soviet commentary on the CSCE which served to underline the Soviet view that the Declaration of

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Principles is the key section of the Final Act and takes precedence over all other sections. This commentary also expanded on Soviet interpretations of the meaning of the principles in interstate relations. The European Communist Party Conference in Berlin produced a document which also develops Soviet and Communist interpretations of the principles.

The following is a review of incidents and issues which arose during the reporting period and which relate to the CSCE principles.

Communist Stress on Pre-eminence of the Principles

The Soviets and their Allies continue to give the principles the dominant place in their view of CSCE. Despite the fact that the Final Act establishes the equal importance of all its sections, the Soviets have taken the line that the undertakings of the principles take precedence over the other provisions of the Final Act, in view of their high "political" importance. This position has provided the defense against Western interest in Basket III freer movement subjects, which, the Soviets claim, constitutes interference in their

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internal affairs. The Soviets have also complained that Western focus on Basket III is contrary to the spirit of the CSCE. This Soviet position was reflected in an editorial in Pravda on the first anniversary of Helsinki, which extolled the principles and Soviet adherence to them, and mentioned other parts of the Final Act, but made no allusion whatsoever to Basket III, Humanitarian interests, or even the customary "cultural exchanges" subject heading. The Soviets have complained that the CSCE Commission, and the West in general, unduly stresses Basket III to the point that they are interfering in internal Soviet affairs. In the June "non-paper" on the CSCE Commission which Ambassador Dobrynin handed Assistant Secretary Hartman they took the position that to stress any one part of the Final Act in comparison to its other parts was not in keeping with the unity of the Final Act.

Communists Stress Certain Principles

Communist media and leadership statements have continued to stress the importance of certain principles, particularly non-intervention in internal affairs and

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inviolability of frontiers, despite the fact that the Final Act stipulates equal status for all of the ten CSCE principles. Thus, the principle of inviolability of frontiers has taken on cardinal importance as the basis for relations among European states, and the principle of non-intervention has become the chief defense against Western insistence on the freer movement concepts of Basket 3. At the same time, the principle of human rights has been downgraded and obscured and subjected to a distorted interpretation in the final document of the European Communist Parties Conference (ECPC).

Soviets Distort Certain Principles

The Soviets have subjected certain principles to a concerted program of reinterpretation and distortion. For example, the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms states that the participating states "will act in conformity with . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Nevertheless the ECPC document, which expresses the purported willingness of the European Communist Parties to implement all aspects of the Final Act, omits any reference to the Universal Declaration

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in its section on human rights. Instead it proposes ratification by all states of the more limited International Covenants on Human Rights, which contain a number of escape clauses.

Similarly with regard to the CSCE language on peaceful changes of frontiers, the key balancing element to the principle of inviolability of frontiers, an analytical article in Pravda on July 13 advanced the interpretation that the peaceful change provision applies only to minor adjustments and rectifications of frontiers, and not to the major post-World War II European borders. There is no basis in the CSCE language for such a restrictive interpretation.

Human Rights

The principle of human rights, which forms the foundation for the specific measures of Basket 3, remains one of the most sensitive aspects of the Final Act as well as the principal test of Soviet intentions in the view of most Western observers. There is no indication that the Soviets have changed their approach on these issues since the signing of the Final Act. They continue

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to believe that individual rights must be subordinate to the collective good, as defined by the CPSU. Attention was called to the human rights problem in the Soviet Union during the reporting period by the group of Soviet dissidents which has taken on itself the task of monitoring Soviet compliance with the human rights aspects of the Final Act. This dissident group held a press conference to mark the first anniversary of Helsinki at which its chairman, Yuriy Orlov, distributed a well-argued assessment of the effect the Final Act had had on human rights in the USSR. This paper concluded that the USSR does not intend to fulfill its human rights obligations, but that the CSCE Final Act is nevertheless a valuable tool in pressing Soviet authorities toward better performance in the field of human rights. The Orlov group also distributed a packet of documents including a wealth of information on treatment of political prisoners, repression of religious families and families divided because of Soviet emigration policies.

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UNESCO Symposium on CSCE and Covenants and Human Rights

The Final Act restricts UNESCO's role in implementation of the CSCE provisions to the fields of Culture and Education, since the composition of UNESCO and its voting procedure have resulted in unsatisfactory developments in fields such as Human Rights and Information. In spite of this, the UNESCO Director General's proposed program for implementing CSCE provisions in 1977-78 included the holding of an international symposium on "The effects of the coming into force of the International Covenants on Human Rights, in the light of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference." The Final Act principle on Human Rights gives priority to the more far-reaching Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the US has not ratified the less satisfactory International Covenants on Human Rights. For these reasons most Western countries, including the US, declined to participate in the UNESCO symposium.

Soviet Accusations of Intervention in Internal Affairs

The Soviets have used their media and leadership statements to accuse the West and particularly the US

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of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. This generalized campaign reached a new peak during the reporting period with accusations taken up by Brezhnev himself in an interview on the occasion of the Helsinki anniversary. Soviet and Eastern European allegations have focused on the alleged decision of the US, FRG, UK and France to withhold financial assistance from Italy in the event that communists should be included in the Italian government. Brezhnev's statement, like other Soviet and Eastern European statements on the same subject, viewed this action as contrary to the CSCE principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.

Soviets Protest CSCE Commission

As noted above, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Assistant Secretary Hartman in June to protest the creation of the Joint Legislative/Executive Commission to monitor CSCE and left a "non-paper" which claimed creation of the Commission was contrary to the balance of the CSCE Final Act since it would focus on Basket III. The Dobrynin "non-paper" also claimed the Commission's

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activities would interfere in internal Soviet affairs. The Soviet press agency announced that the Soviets had made this demarche.

Basket 3 and Non-Intervention

Soviet statements and official declarations continue to insist that Western pursuit of Basket III constitutes intervention in internal Soviet affairs. Brezhnev's speech at the European Communist Parties' Conference sharply attacked Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe on these grounds. The Soviets have exhibited increased sensitivity to Western interest in Basket III and have correspondingly increased their stress on non-intervention.

ECPC Document Distorts Final Act Provisions

The ECPC document, which Communist statements have indicated is considered a further development of the CSCE provisions, contains serious distortions of the Final Act in areas of particular concern to the West. One example of this tendency is cited above under the heading "Soviets Distort Certain Principles." Another example is the ECPC document's treatment of the issue

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of freer circulation of information. Whereas the CSCE document commits states "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds," the ECPC document undercuts this commitment by aiming "to insure that mass media everywhere will, on the basis of objective information, be placed in the service of mutual acquaintanceship, the dissemination of ideas for a better understanding and the strengthening of an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among peoples." The ECPC document calls for expanded cooperation among states in keeping with the CSCE Final Act, "which presupposes application of the principle of Most Favored Nation treatment," whereas the CSCE Final Act merely recognizes the "beneficial effects which can result . . . from the application of MFN treatment."

GDR-FRG Border Disputes

Accusations of failure to carry out Helsinki commitments have been exchanged by the GDR and the FRG. The FRG has accused the GDR of violating the principle of human rights by shooting individuals who

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seek to cross the FRG-GDR frontier. The GDR in its turn has accused the FRG of not respecting the inviolability of the GDR frontier by preventing such incidents. The GDR has also accused the FRG of failure to respect its sovereign independence by using the term "intra-German relations" in referring to these incidents.

Tito Accuses Ambassador Silberman of Interference
in Internal Yugoslav Affairs

In an interview on July 31 Tito accused US Ambassador Silberman of "giving lessons about our internal and foreign policy and interfering in our affairs" in an allusion to discussion stemming from the case of imprisoned US citizen Laszlo Toth. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry followed this with a specific accusation that "the US Ambassador interfered in our country's internal affairs in a series of statements made both inside and outside Yugoslavia."

Soviet Allusion to Baltic States Question

In the Soviet reply of May 3 to our earlier general demarche on CSCE the Soviets alluded to US policy on the Baltic states and suggested that this policy was not

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in keeping with the CSCE principles. The Soviets were apparently referring specifically to our omission of officials from the Baltic states from a list of officials from Soviet republics invited to visit the US. They have no doubt also been displeased by reaffirmations of our policy on the Baltic states in response to Congressional and public interest.

Cyprus Situation and CSCE Principles

At the Helsinki Summit Turkey made a formal reservation on the applicability of the provisions of the Final Act to Cyprus, in view of the fact that, as the Turkish Government contended, "the representation of the State of Cyprus in the Conference cannot be considered legal and therefore legitimate." Cyprus then made a formal interpretive statement to the effect that, in view of the language of the Final Act, and Turkey's signature on it, the Turkish reservation "is of no effect". The Cyprus situation remains essentially unchanged, despite efforts of Western countries, including the US, to encourage the parties to the dispute to find a mutually acceptable solution.

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2. Document on Confidence-Building Measures
and Certain Aspects of Security and
Disarmament

There were several significant developments during the reporting period relating to the military security provisions of the Final Act. These included the second Soviet notification of a major maneuver and invitations to observers to view the maneuver, and decisions reached by the Allies concerning notifications to be made in relation to this autumn's cycle of NATO maneuvers and invitations to observers. In addition, the USSR increasingly emphasized disarmament as an important aspect of the Final Act, citing its own disarmament initiatives as implementation of the CSCE. This effort formed part of the continuing Soviet stress on the need to reinforce "political detente" with "military detente."

Prior Notifications of Major Military Maneuvers

The Soviet Union gave notification on May 24 of a maneuver called "Sever" which took place near Leningrad June 14-18 with participation by "approximately 25,000 men." This was the second Soviet

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notification of a major military maneuver. Notification was made by calling in military attaches in Moscow. Soviet television had carried a story on the maneuver one day before the CSCE notification. As noted in the Second Quarterly Report, the first maneuver for which the Soviets gave notification also took place on a NATO flank in the region of the USSR's border with Turkey.

In further consultations at NATO, the Allies revised the total number of Allied maneuvers for notification this fall. They agreed to give notification of two major military maneuvers and five maneuvers below the 25,000 troop threshold during the Autumn Forge exercise series. The maneuver notifications will make reference to Reforger, the yearly movement of US forces from the US to Europe to maneuver with troops already in place there.

As indicated in the last quarterly report, the NATO Allies concurred in our view that readiness tests, consisting of assembly and movement of troops to local dispersal areas, are not military maneuvers under the terms of the Final Act, and are therefore not subject

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to notification. A USAREUR Readiness Test was conducted in early June. Like a similar SACEUR readiness test in March, it drew neither media nor official comment from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Exchange of Observers

The USSR invited observers from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Poland and the GDR to the Sever maneuver, thereby following the same principle of inviting a mix of NATO, neutral and Warsaw Pact states near the maneuver area, as in the case of the Caucasus maneuver in January - February.

Various Allies will invite observers to maneuvers in the Autumn Forge series as follows: Grosser Baer (FRG), Lares Team (FRG), Spearpoint (UK), and Teamwork 76 (Norway). Norwegian invitations to Teamwork will be the first Allied invitations accorded on a selective basis to certain NATO, neutral and Warsaw Pact country observers within a regional framework. The Norwegians explained that constraints imposed by limited facilities dictated this selective approach.

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Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich stated in Bonn during the reporting period that the USSR did not send observers to the Certain Trek maneuver during last fall's NATO exercise season, because acceptance, as well as issuance, of invitations to observers was voluntary. He also noted that the large-scale 1975 fall NATO maneuvers seemed to him to be a demonstration of strength immediately following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the Soviet Union could not send observers and thereby "approve of" the NATO maneuvers.

Other Confidence-Building Measures

A provision under this CBM calls for states, on a reciprocal basis, to promote exchanges among military personnel. Canada and the USSR have agreed on an exchange of naval visits in late 1976, with three Soviet vessels visiting Vancouver and three Canadian ships visiting Leningrad. An exchange of notes on these visits between Canada and the USSR referred to the CSCE provisions.

Questions Relating to Disarmament

The Soviets increasingly emphasized during the reporting period that the Final Act calls for a lessening

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of military tension and promotes disarmament to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen security. A senior Soviet official recently stated in Bonn that a Soviet aim in CSCE follow-up efforts is disarmament. In his speech at the Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties (ECPC) Brezhnev called attention to Soviet disarmament proposals as a form of implementation of the CSCE. The final document of the ECPC itself included a comprehensive list of Soviet and Eastern European disarmament initiatives as examples of implementation of the disarmament section of the Final Act.

CBMs at Belgrade

Discussion began among the Allies about the possibility that new proposals related to CBMs may be submitted at the Belgrade follow-up meetings. Possible new proposals which were mentioned included improvement of the parameters for notification of maneuvers and negotiation of a new CBM on notification of military movements. We have also been informed of the possibility that certain neutral states may propose establishment of an institutional link between CSCE and MBFR.

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B. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1. Commercial Exchanges.
2. Industrial Cooperation and Projects of Common
Interest.
3. Provisions Concerning Trade and Industrial
Cooperation.
4. Science and Technology.
5. Environment.
6. Cooperation in Other Areas.
 - Transport
 - Tourism
 - Migrant Labor
 - Training of Personnel

Concrete implementation activities on Basket II during the past quarter have been notably meager. Rather, the period seems to have been more one of rhetoric from the communist countries, particularly in connection with the first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act. The chief focus of their attention continues to be Brezhnev's call for all-European energy, transport, and environment conferences.

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On the question of conferences, a decision adopted at the ECE 31st session invited member governments to transmit their views to ECE Executive Secretary Stanovnik for dissemination at the 32nd session next spring. While most of the Eastern European countries have vocally supported the Soviet initiative during the past quarter, only Hungary has so far actually notified the ECE Secretariat in writing of its agreement with the conferences idea.

In the West, there has been scant attention paid to positions and tactics for dealing with the Brezhnev proposal. At the ECE Western Caucus meeting July 2, for example, only the UK was prepared to provide an initial response, and that was to note that there was no need as yet to take a firm position on the Soviet initiative. The UK believes that reports of ECE principal subsidiary bodies on the subjects the Soviets proposed would have to be considered, possibly in the context of preparations for Belgrade.

Elsewhere, in bilaterals with the FRG the Germans stated that they see some merit in the environmental

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topics, particularly if the Soviets could be induced to agree to the inclusion of representatives from the FRG Environmental Agency (located in Berlin) in the German delegation to such a conference. On energy and transport, however, the Germans see almost no utility in holding all-European conferences.

In the meantime, the US is attempting to utilize all ECE meetings which have taken place since the 31st session to call members' attention to and mold work programs around the "special attention" projects decision taken in April. One such activity is the ECE Task Force for Development of a Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants, which met in May and will hold another session in November.

Another important activity, through which we are trying to hold the East to its CSCE and "special attention" commitments, is the ECE Fourth Seminar on East-West Trade Promotion, Marketing and Business Contacts. A preparatory meeting for this seminar was held July 13, at which, through Western and particularly US insistence, agreement was reached to include the key theme of market

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research (including all aspects of commercial information) on the agenda for the seminar. The Seminar itself will be held in early 1977.

The final major ECE activity during this period related directly to Basket II was the June meeting of Senior Advisors for Science and Technology. As a direct consequence of the 31st session and the "special attention" decision, the S&T senior advisors adopted a wide-ranging work program comprised largely of activities mentioned in the Final Act. These relate mainly to reviews of international S&T cooperation (both bilateral and multilateral), removal of obstacles to and the promotion of the exchange of S&T information and personnel, review of S&T research in selected problem areas, and study of possibilities for expanding multilateral S&T cooperation. At US insistence (and despite vigorous Eastern opposition) the S&T senior advisors agreed to a Secretariat examination of possibilities for the ECE to sponsor conferences, symposia, and study and working groups to bring together younger scientists and technologists from East and West.

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Also at the ECE S&T senior advisors meeting, and in the CSCE context, the UK tabled a proposal that the ECE consider sponsoring symposia and expert meetings in the following areas:

- The Arctic: International Aspects of R&D
- Transport: Freight Movement, High-Speed Rail
Transport and Area Traffic Control
- Space: Monitoring Pollution

No specific agreement was reached on this proposal, and delegations undertook to express national sentiments on the issue directly to the Secretariat.

The final noteworthy Basket II activity during the past quarter was an initiative by Denmark, proposing a symposium of countries which have territories north of the Polar Circle with the aim of exchanging views regarding experience in construction technology in the arctic areas. The Danes initially contacted only the US, Canada, and Norway with this proposal, and, after receiving positive responses, tabled the idea in the NATO Economic Committee. The idea was welcomed by the other Allies

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as well. The Danes plan to move ahead with their initiative by contacting the other CSCE countries with territory in the arctic: Finland, Sweden, and the USSR.

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C. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

There were no specific developments during the reporting period which CSCE states chose to relate to the very broadly drafted provisions of the Final Act on the Mediterranean.

As indicated in the last quarterly report, we anticipate that some CSCE states such as Malta and Yugoslavia, which are interested in expanding the scope of the CSCE provisions to the Mediterranean in connection with their overall foreign policy interests, may begin to express interest in subjects related to the Mediterranean as we move forward toward the 1977 Belgrade follow-up meetings. The Yugoslavs in discussions with the Dutch during the reporting period raised the question of expanding the CBMs provisions to the Mediterranean as a subject for discussion at Belgrade.

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D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

1. Human Contacts.
2. Information.

The trend of events in human contacts and information in the May 1 - July 31 period was generally similar to that described in the Third Quarterly Report.

The Soviets and the Eastern European states continued their aggressive polemical approach on information and human contacts by criticizing US visa refusals to Soviet labor representatives, attacking US and Western radio broadcasting, and claiming an imbalance in Western books and films distributed in the East, as opposed to Eastern books and films available in the West. In reply to Ambassador Stoessel's July 2 presentation on CSCE in Moscow, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko indicated the USSR would continue to criticize publicly US visa refusals and radio broadcasts.

The US during the reporting period continued to raise human contacts and information issues in Moscow and the Eastern European capitals. Figures that became available, and which are cited below under Family Reunification, indicate a significant increase in emigration from the USSR to the US in

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the first six months of 1976. At the same time, the Soviet Jewish emigration rate remains only slightly above the level of last year. Another significant development was a Soviet announcement indicating that Western journalists could apply for interviews directly to Soviet officials, although it remains to be seen what effect this measure will have in practice. The GDR has also taken similar steps to improve working conditions for journalists.

A summary of the review of US visa practice in relation to the provisions of the Final Act will be provided in the Fifth Quarterly Report. The review will indicate what improvements can be made in US practice, taking into account the Final Act and US law. The Visa Office of the Department of State is presently considering liberalizing, on a reciprocal basis, the condition of issuance of selected categories of visas to nationals of certain communist countries. The Visa Office is also exploring the possibility of proposing legislative measures for the facilitation of travel.

As indicated in the Third Quarterly Report, the Department of State, at the urging of the GAO, has under consideration the question of raising US Immigrant Visa

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fees from \$25 to \$58 (\$33 for children under 16) as provided by law. We can anticipate criticism from the Soviets and East Europeans for increasing immigrant visa fees, rather than lowering them as specified in the Final Act.

1. Human Contacts.

Family Reunification

Soviet issuance of exit visas for Soviet citizens to join relatives in the US for permanent residence has been increasing. The numbers of emigrants processed by our Embassy in Moscow are as follows:

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976 (through 6/76)</u>
230	287	494	758	1029	1162	1303

As indicated, the emigration rate was slowly increasing until this year when the number of persons processed in the first six months of 1976 for entry into the US more than equalled the total for all of 1975. Almost all the increase is in one ethnic category - Armenians. Issuance to Soviet Jews of exit visas for the US is only slightly higher than before the CSCE. However, the overall numerical increase is a significant development.

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Issuance of exit visas for Israel through the first six months of 1976 was slightly higher than during the same period in 1975. However, the recent average monthly rate of approximately 1,200 dropped off in July and August. It remains to be seen whether this is simply a seasonal slump, or the beginning of a downward trend.

We have received reports that the Soviet authorities in several cities are processing foreign emigration invitations to Soviet Jews more restrictively, and that when prospective emigrants are not able to document a family relationship, the invitation is not accepted. This practice could have a detrimental effect on emigration if it becomes widespread. There are also reports of a new, more restrictive Soviet definition of "family" for emigration purposes by some Soviet visa offices, limiting travel to join only spouses or unmarried or minor children. This new definition is said to be linked by Soviet officials to the CSCE; it is reportedly being applied only in certain areas of the USSR. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, 15 Jewish activists also noted that since last May those who intend to seek an exit visa from the USSR must give up their apartments before applying

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to emigrate. (Our information does not indicate that this is a general problem.) While the Final Act notes that the rights of applicants should not be modified because of their request to emigrate, the letter noted that if denied a visa "the applying family is left without shelter from the elements".

Although not occurring within the reporting period, on August 5, Ambassador Stoessel presented our 18th Representational List to the Soviets, citing CSCE provisions on the reunification of families. Noting that the cases of 35 families consisting of 95 individuals from our Representational List 17 of August 1975 had been favorably resolved, the Ambassador expressed hope for a better Soviet record on the new list. Representational List 18, containing 112 families consisting of 312 individuals, has been rigorously authenticated, criteria for inclusion being that the individual must have been refused emigration, and must be the relation of an American citizen or an alien admitted to the US for permanent residence. (The previous Representational List included 249 families or 641 individuals of which -- besides the above-mentioned 35 resolved family-cases -- 100 family-cases consisting of 229 individuals have been for various reasons withdrawn from the new list.)

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During presentation of the new Representational List Ambassador Stoessel requested that when cases on the list are refused, we be informed of the reason. In response to the Soviet reply that it had no obligation to explain why visas are refused or exit permission denied, the Ambassador suggested that both sides try to deal with the problem of explaining refusals at forthcoming consular review talks.

On June 15, new Soviet regulations on receipt of gift merchandise from abroad went into effect, increasing duties significantly, and, in some instances, imposing stricter limits on the number of articles per package. Like the revised Soviet regulations on gift cash remittances from abroad, covered in the Second Quarterly Report on CSCE Implementation, the new restrictions on gifts will apply to all Soviet citizens. They are not specifically related to CSCE provisions but will be especially hard on intending emigrants and those who are refused emigration and are consequently without work. This change in Soviet regulations on foreign gifts has evoked significant public and Congressional

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interest. Secretary Kissinger has conveyed our concern about the measure to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, and we have asked the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the matter.

As noted in the last Quarterly Report, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Field Office in Rome has refused conditional entry in about 8 - 10 cases to Soviet emigrants because of their past Communist Party membership, although the US Embassy in Moscow had found them eligible for relief from the pertinent ineligibility provision, under the "involuntary" provision of section 212(a)(28)(I)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. There is some difference of opinion between INS and the Department of State regarding the interpretation of the provision on involuntary membership in Communist organizations, which the Department of State is discussing with INS Central Office.

As noted in the Second Quarterly Report, Dean Cornelius Hoxsey, a former American who is now a

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Soviet citizen, has cited the CSCE in requesting approval of his application to return to the US. However, Hoxsey's former membership in the US Communist Party renders him ineligible, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), to receive a visa to return permanently. The State Department has under consideration a recommendation to the INS that Hoxsey's case be reviewed in light of the CSCE, and that he be paroled into the US.

Unlike the case of the USSR, there have not been significant increases in emigration rates from the Eastern European countries, although there has been some improvement in emigration to the United States from Romania, where emigration is linked by the Trade Act to MFN. Nevertheless, there have been several developments on divided families in Eastern Europe during the reporting period.

In a meeting with Assistant Secretary Hartman on July 8, the GDR Ambassador claimed that over half the divided family cases on the first list presented by the US to the GDR had been resolved. However,

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this amounts to the resolution of only 14 of 27 cases over more than two years, and 4 of these cases were resolved independently of GDR authorities. Several cases not on the first list are also pending. The US Embassy in Berlin has followed-up on cases where intending emigrants to the US have lost their jobs, citing the CSCE provision that the "rights and obligations of those applying for emigration should not be modified because of their applications."

FRG officials have told us that the number of GDR nationals applying to emigrate to West Germany at the FRG Permanent Representation in East Berlin has been steadily increasing. FRG officials attribute this increased interest in emigration to rumors in East Germany that the GDR may soon toughen emigration policy; West German media, however, have linked emigration interest to the CSCE provisions. FRG officials fear that the increasing rate of applications for GDR exit permits may jeopardize the successes achieved in 1975 when the GDR issued over 10,000 emigration permits for the FRG for "family reunification",

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although only about half of those granted permits actually had family ties in the FRG.

In connection with a long-standing divided family case, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry notified our Embassy in Prague that the reunification of the family should take place in Czechoslovakia, and that the case of the person who wished to emigrate to join her husband was "finally refused". Our Embassy replied by note that, according to the CSCE provisions, the place of reunification could not be limited; that the decision to pursue emigration rested with the individual, not the state; and that the state therefore could not "finally refuse" permission to emigrate.

Secretary of Treasury Simon and Assistant Secretary Hartman raised divided families during their visit to Poland in June; Ambassador Davies also raised several individual cases with Polish officials in July. During a visit by a Polish parliamentary group to Washington in June Ryszard Frelek, foreign policy adviser to Gierek and head of the visiting group, said that the overall question of family reunification

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is being studied in Poland. Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage took up the subject with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Adamski in Washington late in July. Adamski said that the Poles could pay adequate attention to this issue now that the divided families problem with the FRG had been taken care of, for the most part. The Polish situation is potentially sensitive because of the large number of outstanding US-Polish divided family cases.

As noted in the last quarterly report, Secretary of Agriculture Butz was informed by Bulgarian authorities in Sofia that 42 of the 72 cases of Bulgarians wishing to be reunited with their families in the US would be given permission to do so. Sixteen have since been issued visas.

The emigration rate from Romania to the United States continues to be well above past years. Although the rate for the first six months of 1976 is slightly lower than for the last six months of 1975, which followed the granting of MFN, the current 1976 annual emigration rate far surpasses the rate for any previous year.

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On June 21, the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in Geneva sent a letter to all CSCE states, noting the CSCE provisions on reunification of families and offering the services of ICEM to assist in the realization of those provisions. While no role for ICEM was foreseen by the CSCE Final Act, because the membership of that organization varies considerably from that of the CSCE, we have replied to ICEM, indicating our support for its initiative.

The Director General of UNESCO, in his proposed program for implementation in 1977-78 of the CSCE provisions relating to UNESCO, has proposed a study of "measures to facilitate the mobility of persons." This subject is beyond the mandate given to UNESCO for implementation of CSCE which was limited to provisions relating to cultural and educational exchanges. Most Western countries have opposed UNESCO involvement with CSCE provisions relating to Human Contacts (see also above section on Principles -- subheading on "UNESCO Symposium on CSCE and Covenants on Human Rights.")

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Family Visits and Bi-national Marriages

Communist policy on family visits and bi-national marriages continues to vary widely from country to country. We continue to raise family visits and bi-national marriages in the CSCE context on a case-by-case basis. For example, in the GDR we continue to pursue a case where the fiancée of an American citizen has lost her job in connection with her intended marriage and emigration.

During the first six months of 1976 issuance of exit visas for private visits by GDR citizens to relatives in the US totaled about 740, which is about 40% higher than the 1974 and 1975 rates.

In Prague during the reporting period US Embassy officers discussed with Foreign Ministry officials the Czechoslovak practice of refusing permission for persons to visit relatives in the US. The officials explained that exit visas were refused to Czechs and Slovaks wishing to visit relatives who were abroad "illegally" (i.e., without official permission),

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although exceptions to this rule were made on a case-by-case basis. The officials also indicated that there might be some liberalization in Czechoslovak practice within the next few months.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

As indicated in the last quarterly report, in keeping with a Final Act provision that states should lower non-immigrant visa (NIV) fees to promote travel, as well as standing US policy to lower NIV fees wherever possible on a reciprocal basis, we instructed our embassies in the five CSCE countries which charge NIV fees (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland) to make a proposal to host governments to reduce NIV fees down to a no-fee status. To date, Hungary and the GDR have replied negatively to our initiative; their reluctance to lower NIV fees is evidently based on the need to continue such fees at the present level to obtain much needed hard currency from Western travelers.

The requirement in the Eastern European states for Western visitors to exchange up to \$10 per day

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for each adult may be a greater barrier than visa fees to travel to the East. We have asked US embassies in Eastern Europe for details on exchange requirements, as a first step in exploring the possibility of seeking reductions in exchange levels, at least for pensioners.

Soviet media and officials, including Brezhnev at the European Communist Party Conference in Berlin on June 29, have sharply criticized the US for refusing visas to Soviet labor representatives, and have cited such refusals as a violation of the CSCE provisions. A Soviet Embassy officer, when informed of the visa refusal, observed that the refusal came at a time when the US is pressing the USSR to implement the Basket III provisions. A high-ranking Soviet Foreign Ministry official, taking exception to the refusals on grounds of Communist Party membership, wondered what the reaction in the West would be if the USSR refused visas on the grounds that the applicants were Republicans, Democrats or European Christian Democrats.

In response to public and Congressional queries on the refusals, we pointed out that the labor

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representatives were refused under the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding Communist Party membership; that waivers of ineligibility were not recommended in keeping with long-standing policy in such cases; and that the views of the mainstream of the American labor movement were taken into account in the matter. In connection with the CSCE, we indicated that the US supports the provisions which generally promote travel and contact among individuals and organizations. However, there is no specific Final Act reference to travel and contacts among labor representatives because of the US position on the subject. In signing the Final Act, all participants were aware of our long-standing policy and had accepted our position against a reference to such exchanges.

On the other hand, the communist countries continue to refuse visas to individuals and groups. During the reporting period, the Soviet Union refused visas to an American rabbi and his associate without explanation. The Soviets also refused visas to a group of three Jewish newsmen from Buffalo because of the "anti-Soviet"

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activities of certain American Jewish groups. In both cases, the Soviets said further visa requests might be considered favorably at a later time. Also, as noted in the last quarterly report, the USSR refused a visa to a Voice of America correspondent. When this matter was raised with a Soviet official in May, he countered with the example of US visa refusals to Soviet labor representatives.

On May 1, we informed the Soviets that we were opening certain areas in the US formerly closed to Soviet diplomats stationed here. The Soviets "took note" of our action. On July 17, Assistant Secretary Hartman reminded Ambassador Dobrynin that we are awaiting a response to our initiative.

Religious Contacts and Information

The Soviet Union gave permission to three Lithuanian bishops to travel to the US in August for a Eucharistic Conference in Philadelphia and later to the Vatican. According to the Vatican, which views this Soviet action within the CSCE framework, seven priests from the USSR went to

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the conference. Poland and Hungary were also represented at the Eucharistic Conference by high-level Church officials. The Polish delegation was among the largest.

Tourism; Meetings among Young People; Sport; Expansion of Contacts

The Visit USA Committee, comprised of local American businessmen and US Embassy officials to promote tourism to the US, had its first meeting with Intourist officials in Moscow on May 10. The purpose of the meeting was to solicit the views and assistance of Intourist on ways to promote tourism. The US side also made several specific proposals for consideration by Intourist. The Soviets seemed generally receptive at this initial session; the Committee hopes to arrange additional meetings.

The European Youth Security Conference, which was organized by a communist-dominated youth organization, took place in Warsaw in June. Neither the US Youth Council (USYC) or the American Council of Young Political Leaders (ACYPL) were invited to preparatory meetings

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for the Conference; invitations to participate in the Conference itself arrived late and requested each organization to send a single delegate who would serve only as an observer. The USYC and ACYPL rejected these limited invitations as not being in keeping with the CSCE.

As to American youth groups, an ACYPL delegation visited Romania on July 22-29 for meetings with Romanian youth groups. Additional information on youth activities is contained in this report under Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of Culture.

Sports exchanges continue to be an active area of East-West activity. Some 30 US teams traveled to Poland during the three-month reporting period to compete in various sports, including basketball, volleyball and soccer. A US volleyball team played a series of matches in the USSR in June, and there was a US-USSR juniors track meet in Leningrad in early July. Also, a junior US womens' basketball team played in Bulgaria in July.

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Additionally, a Soviet soccer team played a German team in Washington, D. C. during the reporting period. A Romanian handball team toured the US in July, and a Bulgarian basketball team played several matches in New England in early July.

The expansion of contacts provisions continues to be a sensitive area, as communist media and spokesmen attack US refusal of visas to certain communist groups, such as Soviet labor representatives.

2. Information,

Oral, Printed, Filmed and Broadcast Information;

Cooperation in Field of Information

The communist attacks on the content of US and Western broadcasting as being contrary to the CSCE continued during the reporting period. Brezhnev personally joined the attack in his June 29 speech at the Conference of European Communist Parties when he charged that the existence of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe "is a direct challenge to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords." We continue to refute this type of argumentation, noting that all CSCE

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states are committed under the Final Act "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds."

As noted in the Third Quarterly Report, at Soviet and East European instigation, the accreditation of RFE was revoked by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on a technicality at the Winter Olympic Games. After steps were taken by the management of RFE and RL, with the assistance of the US, to guard against a repetition, the IOC granted accreditation to the two organizations to cover the 1976 Summer Games in Montreal despite a Soviet and East European effort to deny the radios' accreditation.

The Soviets and Eastern Europeans continue to compare the comparatively large number of Western books and films available in their countries to the smaller number of Eastern books and films in the West. This position has become a prominent fixture of communist CSCE policy and is likely to continue to the 1977 follow-up meetings. This reasoning tries,

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by way of statistical comparisons, to make the case that the East is implementing the Basket III provisions, despite claims to the contrary by the West.

In a related development, news reports have publicized the Soviet practice of deleting portions of Western books for political and ideological reasons. In one case, a Hemingway classic was altered to present a communist in a more favorable light.

There was no change during the reporting period in numbers of copies and titles of Western newspapers and periodicals available in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The Director General of UNESCO, in his proposed program for implementation in 1977-78 of the CSCE provisions relating to UNESCO, has proposed consultations with broadcasting organizations from Eastern and Western Europe in order to arrange for increased program exchanges. This subject is beyond the mandate given to UNESCO by the CSCE Final Act, which was limited to implementation of provisions relating to Cultural and Educational exchanges. Most Western countries have

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opposed UNESCO involvement with CSCE provisions relating to Information. (See also above section on Principles -- subheading on "UNESCO Symposium on CSCE and Covenants on Human Rights.)

Working Conditions for Journalists

US Embassy officers in Moscow continue to have frequent contact with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials on such matters as wider travel opportunities and greater access to sources for American journalists.

In mid-July the Soviets announced that foreign journalists in Moscow will be permitted to contact government officials directly instead of applying through the Foreign Ministry. According to a Foreign Ministry source, this move confirms a procedure that is already followed by many Soviet officials. American journalists in Moscow seem to doubt that this action will lead to greater access to Soviet officials or to better sources of information, although it will require some time to determine its application in practice.

A similar change has been announced by the GDR. Effective July 1, 1976, journalists accredited to the

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GDR are authorized to request information directly from the press offices of individual government ministries, rather than only through the Foreign Ministry as in the past. FRG journalists accredited in East Berlin report an increasingly business-like attitude toward them on the part of GDR officials. Although high-level party functionaries remain inaccessible, the journalists have noted success in dealing directly with individual ministries in the weeks since July 1.

Also effective July 1, dependents of accredited journalists are now entitled to documents that facilitate travel between East and West Berlin and between the GDR and the FRG. The GDR, however, continues to refuse accreditation to American and other journalists based in West Berlin and the FRG.

On May 25 the Soviet paper Literaturnaya Gazeta charged that three American journalists in Moscow were linked to the CIA. Follow-up Soviet news stories went so far as to imply that one of the journalists, who had entered a suit for slander against Literaturnaya

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Gazeta (subsequently dropped), had been involved in illegal activities. The newsmen and their papers categorically denied any connection with the CIA. While this type of harassment of journalists is not covered specifically by the CSCE provisions, the effect of the Soviet charges has been to detract from progress made in working conditions for journalists in the USSR in such areas as the granting of multiple entry-exit visas, somewhat wider travel opportunities, and the possibility of easier access to sources.

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D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS

3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture.
4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education.

In the year since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have expressed interest in expanding existing educational and cultural exchanges with the US and in initiating new exchanges.

In review talks with the Department of State in December 1975 the Soviets proposed to increase the existing reciprocal exchanges of graduate students and young scholars, a proposal the Department agreed to consider and which will be discussed further during negotiations on the 1977-79 program of exchanges. The Soviets have also shown interest in bilateral seminars in fields of common interest. Two seminars have been held in education and two are being planned in theater and literature. The Soviets have also agreed to a proposal to expand the exchange of leaders for short-term visits,

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and Soviet delegations in the fields of journalism, radio and TV, literature, and library science have visited the US. The Soviets have also agreed in principle to an expansion of the long-term exchange of Fulbright lecturers between universities of the two countries, details of which are now being worked out. In a new policy departure, the Soviets have given approval in principle to direct exchanges between universities of the two countries. Expansion of other exchanges with the Soviets has been limited by a shortage of funds on the US side caused by a rescission in the Department's FY 76 budget for educational and cultural exchanges.

In Eastern Europe a similar interest has been evident. With Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, countries with which previously we have had very limited exchanges, we are now negotiating intergovernmental exchanges agreements which are expected to lead to an expansion of these activities. In 1973 the GDR agreed for the first time to conduct scholarly exchanges with the US, and the first US Government-

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supported American and East German scholars will begin exchanges in September. With Poland direct exchanges of students and lecturers with US universities continue to proliferate.

While there are still limitations and controls on the educational and cultural exchanges we can conduct with the Communist countries, the CSCE Final Act appears to have given a cautious approval to those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe desiring to expand mutually advantageous exchanges with the US.

Developments during the May 1-July 31 period relating to the cultural and educational provisions of the Final Act coincided for the most part with patterns noted in previous Quarterly Reports. Implementation continued to be channelled through primarily bilateral - but also multilateral - arrangements developed prior to the CSCE, and the provisions on cultural and educational cooperation remained less controversial than the Basket III sections concerning Human Contacts and Information. Progress toward

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implementation continued to reflect the slow but positive trend of expanding activities which has characterized East-West cultural and educational relations in recent years. As in the past, however, ideological differences, national interests, and the availability of funds have set parameters limiting broader implementation.

There were no major changes during the reporting period in the position of the USSR and the Eastern European states regarding cultural and educational cooperation. As noted below, however, there were some new developments in exchanges along established lines of cooperation.

The Soviet Union and its Eastern European Allies are ever on the alert to reinterpret the Final Act of the CSCE to their benefit. At the 99th session of the UNESCO Executive Board (April 26 - May 26, 1976), the GDR, with the backing of the Soviets and East Europeans, offered a draft resolution which, if adopted, would have broadened UNESCO's role in the implementation of the Final Act. A preambular paragraph of the GDR resolution considered UNESCO "capable of serving in the future as an instrument of wider regional co-operation,"

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while an operative paragraph invited the Director-General "to take all the steps he considers appropriate to carry out the measures envisaged" in his program. The United States and Western European countries were successful in eliminating the GDR language in the final resolution and in separating the specific projects noted in the above sections on Human Contacts and Information from those activities legitimately carried out by UNESCO in the CSCE context.

In terms of US action, an important development during the reporting period was a meeting June 14 between representatives of the publishing industry and government officials to discuss ways to implement the sections of the Final Act pertaining to books. As a result of that meeting, agreement was reached on an agenda of possible new initiatives in this area. The meeting was also noteworthy in that it was undertaken at the initiative of the private sector which in the US must bear much of the burden in carrying out certain Basket III provisions. Another benchmark of the reporting period involved events surrounding observance of the US Bicentennial.

In other areas, the US continued negotiations on bilateral exchanges agreements in scientific, educational and cultural areas with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and

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Hungary. There were some positive developments in cultural and educational cooperation with Romania. As in the past, the USSR and Poland in Eastern Europe continued to be the countries in which most US educational and cultural activity centered.

* * * * *

Set out below are specific examples of activities in the cultural and educational fields covered by Basket III.

3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture.

Extension of Relations; Mutual Knowledge;
Exchanges and Dissemination; Access;
Contacts and Cooperation; Fields and Forms
of Cooperation.

As noted above, the potentially most significant new development during the reporting period was the June 14 meeting of representatives from government and the private sector to review proposals for possible initiatives in the area of books and libraries. During the meeting the publishing community was encouraged to make a specific proposal to the Soviets regarding the establishment of an American Bookstore in Moscow. The Association of American Publishers (AAP) will

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also explore the possibility of having a Book Fair on the Culture of the CSCE Nations in Moscow. Following the UNESCO General Conference in Nairobi this November - at which it is anticipated that a new protocol to the Florence Agreement will be adopted - the Department of State will urge CSCE nations not a party to the Florence Agreement (i.e., Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Portugal, San Marino, Turkey and the USSR) to join the agreement which facilitates educational, scientific and cultural materials by removing certain customs barriers.

In the publishing field, the AAP also hosted in July the visit of two Soviet officials to discuss future exchanges between the US and the USSR and a joint Publishers Seminar presently scheduled to be held in Moscow this September. The AAP's International Trade Committee is also developing a paper, based on the recommendations and comments made during the June 14 meeting at the Department of State, on reestablishing the Informational Media Guaranty Program (IMG) or a similar organization. USIA is also studying the question.

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Some developments during the reporting period involving the USSR and Eastern European countries were keyed to observance of the Bicentennial. Soviet, Polish and Romanian sailing vessels were among the 225 ships from 30 countries which participated in "Operation Sail." Following the festivities in New York Harbor on July 4, the Polish schooner Dar Pomorza, the largest of three Polish ships which participated in "Operation Sail," continued on to Savannah, Georgia. There it delivered an urn of soil from the birthplace of Count Casimir Pulaski which was presented by the Polish Ambassador to the US to the people of Savannah in a ceremony honoring the Revolutionary War hero, who was mortally wounded during the 1779 Siege of Savannah.

Polish television highlighted July 4 by broadcasting a 15-minute salute to the Bicentennial which

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relayed via satellite from the US. The newscast was led off with a ten-minute filmed segment of ceremonies at the Polish Sejm during which First Secretary Gierek presented US Ambassador Davies with models of statues of Polish-born Revolutionary War heroes Pulaski and Kosciuszko which will be placed in American cities. Polish television also marked the Bicentennial by broadcasting a Kosciuszko Foundation-produced film on Poles in the United States.

After initially strong negative coverage by the media in the GDR -- most notably a documentary broadcast July 2, entitled "America: Sick Land" -- the GDR presentation of the Bicentennial assumed a positive tone. A special observance, hosted by the GDR League of People's Friendship and the Institute for International Relations of the Academy of Political Science and Jurisprudence, was held in East Berlin July 22. GDR television carried a report on the observance and focused upon the presence of US Ambassador Cooper. The GDR's sudden observance of the Bicentennial represented an unusually positive

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gesture and probably is intended as a signal of GDR interest in further movements in US-GDR relations. Czechoslovak authorities also held special ceremonies for the Bicentennial in one of the warmest gestures towards the US in recent years.

Romania's response on the occasion of the Bicentennial has also been extremely positive. Our Embassy in Bucharest reports that the National Day reception was marked by the largest and highest-level turn-out ever, including attendance by Prime Minister Manea Manescu. The Romanian press also published articles on US-Romania relations written by Ambassador Barnes and the Economic Counselor at our Embassy in Bucharest. A third article, written by Ambassador Barnes on Idealism and Pragmatism in American History, is to appear in a scholarly journal published by the Romanian Association for International Law and International Relations. This marks the first time Romania has ever published articles written by Western diplomats resident in Bucharest. In addition, a Romanian publishing house is planning to release a book dealing with American graphics as a tribute to the Bicentennial. In September the same publishing house, in conjunction with USIA, will issue a Bicentennial photo album.

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Attendance by Soviet officials at the National Day reception at the US Embassy in Moscow and the media coverage in the USSR in connection with the Bicentennial were also very good. Ambassador Stoessel's five-minute presentation on July 4th was carried on Soviet prime-time news. Soviet television also broadcast coverage of a Soviet-sponsored meeting observing the Bicentennial which was hosted by the USSR-USA Society and the Institute of the USA and Canada.

In the area of films, the USSR, as noted in the Third Quarterly Report, continues to cite "discrimination" towards Soviet films by Western film distributors and festival organizers. They specifically note the absence of Soviet films at the Cannes festival. The basis for the low number of Soviet and Eastern European films seen in the West, however, rests with their lack of audience appeal. To help in part to remedy this situation, the Department of State has proposed to the Soviets that they consider an initial exchange of young film directors to learn Western

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techniques which might enhance both audience acceptance and thus the financial viability of their movies in the West. Our Embassy in Moscow has also proposed an exchange of film festivals which the USSR State Committee on Cinematography has accepted. We are currently discussing possible dates for our festival in Moscow.

Talks between a US film company and Soviet officials were conducted June 22-25 in Moscow on a second US/USSR co-production entitled "Sea Pup". As a result of these discussions a protocol and preliminary agreement were signed. Filming will be conducted both in the US and USSR with actors from both countries participating in the movie which is scheduled to be released in late 1977. Also during the reporting period, the Environmental Protection Agency's film "Does It Have to Be This Way?" was shown on Czech television on nation-wide, prime viewing time. The film was an entry in "Ecofilm '76", this year's International Show of Films on the Environment in Prague.

In connection with their Bicentennial observance, Romanian television aired two films made in conjunction with USIA by a Romanian film team. The first film,

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shown nationwide on prime-time on June 29, dealt with the cities of New York and San Francisco. The second film concerned American history and was broadcast during prime-time on July 4, just prior to Ambassador Barnes' 10-minute national day presentation. To cap the occasion Romanian television made it an entirely American evening by showing "That's Entertainment" as the evening movie. Also during the reporting period, a special 30-minute program on the Viking project, based primarily on material provided by USIA, was broadcast on Polish television.

Exchanges in the performing arts included the visits to the USSR by the American Conservatory Theater (ACT) and the North Texas State University Jazz Band. The latter group gave concerts during June in the Soviet cities of Yerevan, Tbilisi, Baku, Leningrad and Moscow while ACT presented some twenty-two performances of "Desire Under the Elms" and "Matchmaker" to audiences in Moscow, Leningrad and Riga. Soviet performing artists visiting the US included the Russian Festival of Music and Dance which began

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its tour in New York City June 28 and also performed in Holmdel, New Jersey; Ambler, Pennsylvania; and Boston during the reporting period. A Soviet Quartet also played with the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, June 18-26.

In the area of exhibits, the Soviet display, "Scientific Siberia," continued its tour of the US. The USSR also provided a Soyuz capsule for the recent opening of the Smithsonian's National Aeronautics and Space Museum. On the US side, the exhibit, "Photography USA" opened in July in Kiev. The Soviet USA Institute has also given us an informal positive response concerning cooperation in joint seminars on the American Revolution, Issues in American History, and the US After 1976, in connection with our Bicentennial Exhibit opening in Moscow in November 1976. The newly-formed Center for US Studies at Moscow State University has also shown interest in participating in such seminars.

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4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education.

Extension of Relations; Access and Exchanges;
Science; Foreign Languages and Civilization;
Teaching Methods.

Exchanges and the planning for future exchanges highlighted progress towards implementation of the educational provisions of the Final Act during this reporting period. The Soviet Academy of Sciences accepted in principle a proposal by the US National Academy of Sciences for a series of seminars in experimental psychology. On July 10 a delegation of US specialists in this field arrived in Moscow to negotiate the conditions governing such an exchange. The Director of the National Institute of Education also visited Moscow during the reporting period to learn what the Soviets are doing in educational research and to explore possibilities for future exchanges and cooperation.

For their part, a five-person Soviet university library delegation arrived in the US May 2 for a two-

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week visit to public and university libraries in Washington, D. C.; Columbus, Ohio; and New York City. Another US/USSR exchange involved the twelve-week visit under 4-H sponsorship of fifteen young Soviet agricultural specialists to US farms. A similar group of Americans is in the Soviet Union, marking what is believed to be the first time the Soviets have permitted Americans to live on collective farms. In addition, thirty-five American teachers of Russian departed June 12 for a ten-week language program at Moscow State University. Our Embassy in Moscow also noted during the reporting period that the USSR Union of Journalists has responded well to our overtures for journalist exchanges. Reports brought back by the first Soviet participant in a multi-regional project involving radio studies at Syracuse University were positive and set the stage for more such programs. In this connection, a three-person delegation sponsored by the Soviet State Committee on Radio and Television started a short visit to the US on July 20.

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In terms of future exchanges in new areas, the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is looking into the possibility of exchanges of graduate students and senior faculty with the Soviets in business administration and management. The feasibility of American law students going to the Soviet Union for a year of study is also being investigated.

In Eastern Europe, the Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations agreed during the reporting period to a US proposal for a short-term (six-weeks) lecturer exchange during the 1976-77 academic year. Poland has proposed an exchange of publications on historical preservation in Poland and the US. The Director of the Polish Historical Monuments Documentation Center, who visited the United States last fall for a conference on this subject, has been giving a series of lectures in his country on historical preservation in the US.

The Poles are also actively promoting direct exchanges with US universities. Warsaw University and the University of Kansas signed an agreement

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May 18 on student and faculty exchanges to start in September 1976. Warsaw University, in cooperation with Indiana and Illinois Universities, is also preparing to open an American Studies Center in October. Staffed with two US lecturers, and partially funded by a Department of State grant, this will be the first such center staffed with Americans in a Communist country. In addition, Marie Curie Sklodowska University of Lublin, Poland, and Lock Haven State College (Pennsylvania) concluded an exchange agreement which will begin in September.

As noted in the Third Quarterly Report, the Soviets are also coming to see the benefits in direct university-to-university exchanges. During negotiations on an exchange agreement between the State University of New York (SUNY) and Moscow State University, for example, the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education did not seek to exert political or administrative control over arrangements. The Ministry's only change in the SUNY draft concerned stipends. In the discussions on this exchange, the Soviets also

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agreed that at least half the people in the program will come from the humanities and social sciences and noted they are prepared to start exchanges of graduate students and faculty in January 1977. The one possible hitch in the SUNY-Moscow State University negotiations, which could set a precedent for future direct university exchanges, was the Soviet insistence on higher stipends. This, in turn, could place the costs beyond the reach of some US universities that may be interested in such exchanges.

Soviet academic institutions are also becoming more receptive to presentations by Americans in US history. During the reporting period, for example, Harvard Professor Robert Fogel held relatively open discussions with top Soviet historians and economists at a number of prestigious Moscow academic institutions. As the Soviets have generally been agreeable to increased exchanges, sensitivity has grown in the American academic community toward inequalities in access received by Americans in the Soviet Union, as compared with facilities open to Soviets in the US.

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This issue was debated at a recent American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies meeting and was the subject of a scholars' petition and a statement read into the Congressional Record by Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. In a related development, six University of Maryland department chairmen recently informed the International Research and Exchanges Program that they will no longer accept Soviet scholars in their departments. Their decision, they say, is due to the failure of the Soviet government to permit individual Soviet scientists to leave the USSR. On balance, however, our Embassy in Moscow notes that the recently concluded academic year was the smoothest in terms of Soviet support since the signing of the US-USSR exchanges agreement.

The Bicentennial, of course, has heightened Eastern interest in American history. In mid-July, seven US historians and political scientists participated in a special session of the Romanian Academy of Sciences which focused on the US Bicentennial. Following the week-long conference the US participants lectured at various Romanian academic

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institutions on American Life. There were two other developments of significance during the reporting period regarding US-Romanian relations. On July 22-29, a four-person US delegation sponsored by the American Council of Young Political Leaders visited Romania and the Romanian Ministry of Education finally approved an agreement for cooperation between the University of Illinois at Urbana and the University of Cluj.

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E. FOLLOW UP TO THE CONFERENCE

Activity related to the question of the two follow-up meetings to begin in Belgrade in June 1977 continued to increase during the reporting period. At the NATO Ministerial in Oslo on May 20-21 several Ministers addressed the follow-up meetings, expressing some preliminary thoughts on how they should be organized and what should be discussed. Acting on broad policy guidelines provided by the Ministerial discussion, it was agreed at NATO that a second CSCE experts meeting would take place in October, following an EC Nine meeting which will approve a report by the Nine on CSCE. The purpose of the NATO meeting would be to lay the groundwork for a further discussion of CSCE and the follow-up meetings at the December Ministerial.

In addition to NATO consultations, a Department official traveled to Belgrade and Bucharest in late May for discussions of CSCE. In July, the Department instructed embassies in certain neutral capitals to make another presentation to host government CSCE.

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officials on CSCE issues, including the question of the follow-up meetings.

Exchanges among governments have been yielding an increasing number of ideas on the Belgrade meetings with wide differences of view in many cases. For example, the Yugoslavs have said the first follow-up meeting should be brief and the second should be long; the Swiss have suggested the reverse; and a Polish official has said two short meetings would be appropriate. The Western states are generally interested in a serious review of implementation at Belgrade; the communist states evidently want a brief, general meeting which will not go into details. Certain Allied and neutral states may wish to make new proposals, while other Allies and the Eastern states do not appear at this time to be interested in new substantive initiatives. The neutrals will probably press for a regularized follow-up mechanism after the Belgrade meetings.

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